Introduction:
Iraq today is in turmoil due to the destructive invasion led by the United States of America. The ugly war of United States against Iraq as part of the global war on terror brought collateral damages to Iraq. No doubt America is looking for an exit strategy from Iraq and is in a hurry to declare its victory, but changing domestic and regional situations are so bad that entire super power aura become rubble. It has been hard to overestimate what is at stake in Iraq. Basically Iraq war is a failure of United States promotion of democracy in the region and its notion of state building. Now entire regional peace, stability and security are at stake. Iraq as a state is also under serious threat due to separatist movements on the name of separate Kurdistan; bloody rift between Shiites and Sunni and other groups is of key concern in present Iraq. An anti American fervor is at its peak not only in Iraq but also in the entire West Asia. This American adventurism is the result of neoconservative agenda of President George W Bush and Dick Cheney.
After Saddam’s defeat US army started its onslaught and witch-hunting of Iraqi dissents and also started looting and destroying public and private properties of Iraqis. This irresponsible behavior is the main cause of virtual defeat of the United States and became its biggest mistake in the entire mission in Iraq. A fervor of lawlessness erupted, made more extreme because it came after years of suppression. The American army looked weak and unable to control the situation. Baghdad’s National Museum of Iraq was ransacked of much of its priceless artifacts, buildings were burned or their structure became so unsafe they had to be torn down; hospitals schools, factories and homes were pillaged. Seventeen out of twenty-three ministries in Bagdad were razed to the ground. Electricity, water, transport and communication are all at halt since the starting of the war, even no help was provided to the people who were asking help from American soldiers.
Police and other civil service advisers from the United States finally began arriving in Iraq during last week of May 2003, it was too late. They came with neither addresses nor contacts for the Iraqis. One of the classical manifestations of this lack of plan was seen when one of the American advisers went out into the street to ask whether anyone could identify the faces pictured on their files and whether they could be located. The situation was not organized and was chaotic, a combination of ideological vigor, insufficient planning and misperceptions about Iraqi society has meant for the Bush administration, far more troublesome than regime change itself. The lawlessness and looting that greeted the seizure of Bagdad on 9 April 2003 has evolved into an organized, self sustaining and politically motivated insurgency.
For the US government, regime change in Bagdad was seen as the key that would unlock the whole of the West Asia. US want pro US governments in the region to serve its economic, political and geopolitical interests in the region. After September 11 the Bush administration’s attention focused not only specifically on Iraq but also on the wider West Asian region. The majority of the states in the area had proved immune to the spread of democracy and free market economics that greeted the end of Cold War. The Washington Consensus, the economic liberalism imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in the 1990s had little impact on the West Asia, and certainly did not cause any significant political liberalization. Bush directly linked the growth of terrorism facing the United States to the lack of democracy and economic development in the West Asia. In the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, he made it clear that the United States is no longer ready to see the status of the power in the region as it is. US did not want any type of threat to its hegemony in West Asian region.
In Iraq there was Saddam Hussein, the custodian of the second largest oil reserves in the world then. So the Bush administration decided to go there with the intention of imposing American management on the Iraqi oil industry. The American policy makers dreamt of raising Iraq’s oil output to six million barrels a day by 2009, more than double the amount being pumped in 2003. In order to control the oil wealth in Iraq it turned the entire Iraq in to mess. There are some data below with graph and factual proofs to give introductory information of US achievement in Iraq.
The motive behind the invasion and occupation of Iraq
One investigation report has made it clear that the US invasion was deliberate execution of the neoconservative agenda that dominated the thinking of US foreign policy. By applying a pervasive shock therapy and in effect erasing the past, the neoconservative firmly believed that a new state could be set to establish a utopia of a free market economy.
Paul Bermer, who arrived in Iraq on 2 May 2004, set out to accomplish two goals. The first was to apply free market shock therapy to Iraq’s economy, in an apparent effort to jump-start the process he reduced the number of police and military force in Iraq. He ousted 500 000 officers and thus contributed heavily to skyrocketing unemployment rate of 60-70 %. Bremer’s policies created half a million jobless people over night and made resistance to US occupations the only viable alternative to unemployment. His second task entailed banning the Ba’ath party and purging its members from their posts within the government. These two moves resulted in the complete collapse of Iraqi State infrastructure. Bermer’s policies created a political and social vacuum, and pre Ba’ath party social institutions (the tribal, religious and communal formations already emergent under sanctions) were the only agencies left to fill the security vacuum precipitated by the loss of administrative control.
Bermer continued with his agenda and arranged for the largest state liquidation sale of economic enterprise since the collapse of the USSR. While he opened the borders to unrestricted imports with one hand, he closed the door to domestic and Iraqi production with the other by introducing a set of laws in September 2003 aimed at encouraging transitional corporation to move into Iraq and take over the economy. Within these newly introduced laws order 37 dramatically lowered corporate tax from 40% to 15%.
The neoconservative agenda that the US occupation was attempting to implement was a major factor in the escalation of armed resistance. In the first four Months after Bremer’s arrival 109 US soldiers were killed and 570 wounded. Bermer’s shock therapy took effect in the following four months. The number of American casualties almost doubled. In additions the wholesale plundering of Iraq by US corporation envisioned in the foreign investment in financing the armed resistance for self-protection. With 67% unemployment the influx of foreign products and workers into Iraq further fuelled the resistance. Bermer drew up an interim constitution with the commitment that a permanent constitution assembly appointed by democratically elected government would implement the laws, regulation, orders and directives issued by the coalition provisional Authority and would remain in force which were scheduled for 30 January 2005. According to the US rationale under the interim constitution investors could buy Iraqi assets and sign contracts that would secure their investment for40 years. Should any future Iraqi government decide to change the laws, investors could sue for compensation. These all prove beyond any pale of doubt that the only motive for the invasion was to capture the control of the oil and other resources in the country.
Reconstruction Policy:
Restructuring of the political system
The first attempt of the Bush administration after the capture of Bagdad was to bring a government and it wanted to make the people believe that the system they are bringing is far better than what they have before. After the capture of Saddam and a drop in the number of insurgent attacks, some concluded that the multinational forces were prevailing in the fight against the insurgency. But the reality was far from this conclusion as the things turned out to be. The provisional government began training the New Iraqi Security forces intended to defend the country, and the United States promised over $20 billion in reconstruction money in the form of credit against Iraq’s future oil revenues. Following the invasion, the United States established the Coalition Provisional Authority to govern Iraq. Government authority was transferred to an Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004, and a permanent government was elected in October 2005. To establish the interim governing council as legitimate authority, Allawi the least popular politician who suffers a serious lack of legitimacy and is wholly dependent on US support, initiated the Iraqi National Conference, which concluded on18 August 2004. The efforts to bestow legitimately on the interim regime by allowing broader representation in state institutions, has a reverse effect as it widened and deepened political fractures in Iraqi society. In order to enhance the legitimacy of the interim government the conference would have had an election to the council which would be representative of at least some significant players of Iraq’s national political force. Instead of incorporating the two main, Kurdish political forces of northern Iraq and tribal and urban union of marginalized Arab political forces, it incorporated in their place the expatriate Iraqis who returned on the heels of the US occupations. National political forces in Iraq’s central and southern zone are largely composed of Sunni and Shiite Arab rejectionist who opposed the occupation. Within the Arab rejectionist camp, up to August 2004, the Hawza (the Shiite religious elite led by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani) had represented the main Shiite body and the Sunni Muslim Scholar’s Associations the main Sunni body. In addition to the rejectionist camp, indigenous political forces included a number of smaller civil society groups organized over the interest o f ethnic and religious minorities, and tribal leaders who all sought a great role in the transition. Thus rather than opting for a policy of inclusion of national forces the parties that have controlled the transition created the Advisory Council in their image to work with the US occupation and Allawi’s regime. This exclusion of significant national political forces from the nation-building process alienated the significant national political forces from the nation building process and alienated many of the social groupings that would have liked to be a part if the discussion on the future of Iraq and increased the legitimacy of the rejectionist camp among all Iraqis.
In protest of the Fallujahh siege the Islamic Party, Iraq’s most influential Sunni Political group has withdrawn from the government, and the Sunni Muslim Clerics Association urged Iraqis to boycott the planned January elections. Leaders of the Iraqis Islamic Party also cited security as a reason for withdrawing the Sunni Party’s slate of 275 candidates. Insurgents looked bound to attack election officials, candidates and voters. In addition, in the mid November 2004, 47 political parties and groups had already declared their boycott of the elections, citing that the election plan do not express the Iraqi people’s will and their demand for sovereignty and independence. Even in the Kurdish region, support for an early elections was modified to assume a middle course between the Sunni demand for delaying the election and the urging of Shiite (under Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani guidance) for no delays. Masoud Barzani leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party informed the UN envoy that ‘while we are ready for the election on January 30, we will not oppose its delay…. if that will ensure a more comprehensive and inclusive election. In response, 40 political parties connected to al-Hawza and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani rejected delay, in effect reflecting an emerging split along sectarian lines. According to a Knight Rider on 27 December 2004, even the Shiite bloc was divided as to the form of government. A secular democracy was championed by Al- Sadr and Chalabi, but a more focused religious- oriented government was advocated by the Al-Dawa Party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution.
As violence continue to escalate in the Sunni triangle and the north, in November and December 2004 17 major political parties called for the elections to be delayed, including the prime ministers al-Wfaq al- Watani party and the Iraqi Islamic Party. Mohsen Abdul Hamid, head of the party said ‘presently there was no security situation in the country and Iraqis don’t understand the elections yet. We need enough time, at least six months, to prepare ourselves because the Security issue is very complicated’. Further the Sunni Muslim clerics’ Association urged Iraqis to boycott the planned January elections.
Outside Iraq the US military tactics were vociferously opposed. The cumulative impact of the Najaf and Fallujahh campaigns indicated that the USA was losing the war in Iraq politically. Reflecting the increasing international opposition to the US occupation of the Iraq, on 16 September 2004, UN secretary General Kofi Annan told the BBC that the US led invasion of Iraq was illegal, and warned that there could not to be credible elections ‘ if security conditions continue as they are now’. And on 17 November the UN High Commissioner for the Human Right, Louise Arbour, called for an investigation into alleged abuses in Fallujahh, including the disproportionate use of force and the targeting of civilians. Additionally, in the Arab world, US policy in Iraq was increasingly compared with Israeli policy in the West Bank and Gaza. An opinion poll commissioned by the Arab American Institute, the University of Maryland and Zogby Institute in August 2004, reported on the Increasing hostility of educated and business elites in the Arab World towards the US occupation of Iraq.
Elections under occupations:
The Iraqi election took place on 30 January 2005 under extraordinary circumstances of military occupation, rampant insurgency and insecurity. The process was marked by major irregularities, including the appointment of an incognito election commission by the occupying power, secrecy surrounding candidates name and a lack of onsite observers. The final vote count was official announced on 13 February 2005. Sixty million ballot sheets were flown to Iraq days before the election for an estimated 15 million eligible voters. Some 7500 candidates were scattered among 257 lists. Twenty-five Iraqi towns and Cities boycotted the elections. According to Reuter news agency, while there were 63000 polling booths throughout Iraq, there were only 33 763 Iraqi elections monitors. Should this have been the case in another country such as Ukraine, it would have elicited an unmitigated international protest. On 13 February 2005 the Iraqi Election Commissions declared the vote count, and after three days of working out the necessary adjustment in accordance with complex electoral procedures, the final voting was as follows. Out of the 58% voter turnout, the United Iraqi Alliance, which is the list put together by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, won 51 % vote captured 140 seats out of 275. The Kurdish list of Iyad Allawi was something of a surprise because Allawi had all the advantages of incumbency. According to Juan Cole, professor of history at the University of Michigan, Allawi dominated the airwaves in ‘December and January. He went to Bagdad University and made all sorts of promises to the students there and this was dutifully broadcast, and there were lots of similar such photo opportunities. Allawi’s list also spent an enormous amount on campaign advertising. The source of these millions is unknown since Paul Bremer passed a law making disclosure of campaign contributes unnecessary. Despite these enormous advantages clear American backing, money etc. Allawi’s list won only about 14 % of the votes (40 seats) and he certainly lost all chances of becoming the future Prime Minister, which was a clear mandate of the people against the American administration. Other Shiite lists won 11 seats and minor or unknown parties took the very few seats left. The 7500 candidates were arranged on lists of about 117 political entities that were swiftly constructed, professing about 117 political programs, which must have been confusing for the Iraqi voters given the living conditions and the political legacy of dictatorship. According to the Administrative Law drawn up by Bermer, the selection of the president, the two vice presidents and the prime minister requires a two- third majority. The president would choose the prime minister, but this is otherwise is a ceremonial position along with the two positions of the Vice presidents. However to the extent possible in law making, the Administrative Law stipulates ‘a majority which the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) already enjoys. Thus the UIA, which compromise the Supreme council Of Islamic Revolution, led by Abdel Aziz al Hakim, and the Da’wa party led by Ibrahim al-Jafri can make laws without any need for coalition. Yet recent reports communicated by Juan Cole suggested the UIA will enter into coalition with the other small Shiite parties like the Sadrist, thus ensuring a safe majority on issues of legislation.
Destruction:
Contrast between Reform under Saddam and After Invasion
To really assess the magnitude of the destruction that came upon the whole nation following the invasion it would be helpful to have a cursory look at the past experience under Saddam and what kind of a developmental model he was proposing for a heterogeneous nation like Iraq. The socialist element of the Ba’athist philosophy encourages substantial investment in social infrastructure, which means efforts to develop education and health provisions at all levels. But the war and economic sanctions wrecked all the social gains achieved over a period of time. Saddam, as a secularist was prepared to show pragmatic support for Islam but not for fundamentalism, as a result religious groups such as Sunni, Shiite, Christian, Jews, etc. acknowledge a basic loyalty to the state. Saddam’s hostility to the various fundamentalist aspirations made it possible to encourage departures from elements of traditional Arab culture which meant that women were librated as nowhere else in the Arab world. Saddam’s revolution ended Iraqi backwardness to an extent. Iraqi spent her money from oil revenues for construction and modernizing the country, although the huge armed forces consumed a substantial share of it. Education was totally free up to any level, including education abroad for the deserving. Within a decade or so, the Iraqi government had ensured, through compulsion where needed, that the entire population was literate. Roads are still of high quality, and bridges and many Government buildings have been built in the most modern and sophisticated manner.
Despite the toll taken by eight years of the Iran- Iraq war, basic necessities were freely available at reasonable prices, through a public distribution system. Prices of other essential commodities in the private sector were also kept within limits. The evidence points to the impact of sanctions on the population’s well-being and on the national economy. By all accounts, even during the 8 years of war with Iran, the country’s overall development was not affected much, and the Government continued to invest heavily in social services. By 1990, primary health care reached about 97% of the urban population and 78% of the rural population; primary school attendance reached about 83%
More important, centuries of vicious discrimination against girls and women was ended by one stroke of the modernizing dictator’s pen. Saddam Hussein also encourage a fierce nationalism, a conscious pride in the glories of ancient Iraqi history- and proceeded to resurrect historical Babylon as a monument to his own egocentric rule. The table given below would give us a bird’s eye view of the achievement the Iraqi people have under Saddam.
Corruption
Corruption and mismanagement of Iraqis affairs in this interim period between April 2003 and June 2004 was rife. Billions of dollars that had been allocated for the purpose of putting, Iraq on the road recovery disappeared. There was an international outcry at the way lucrative reconstruction contracts seemed to favor those whose businesses helped bankroll George Bush’s 2000 Election campaign, one of those businesses was Halliburton Energy Services. Although the Army Corps of Engineers was authorizes to spend up to seven billion for the oil restoration work the, actual money spent was only one-third of that. American control, Iraq would opt of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, raise its output as much as it wanted, and thus weaken OPEC substantially. Oil prices would fall to $20 a barrel, American would be happy, and the re-election of a Republican Presidency would be assured. Although the Army corps of engineers was authorized to spend up to seven billion U.S dollar for the oil restoration work, the actual money spent was only one-third of that.
The FBI investigation concluded that corruption was on a wide scale and that there were suggestion being paid to foreign and offshore bank accounts. Such corruption became a way of life in the fledgling stage of the new Iraq. Eight billion dollar was spent without proper accounting documentation, with contracts to rebuild infrastructure being agreed to at a hundred times more than actual cost.
Eights thousand names were registered to look after security in different ministries in Bagdad, but only 602 of them were bona fide salaried staff. The other names on the list were “ghost” employees.
Another pointed example of financial mismanagement was the apparent cost of training police in neighboring countries. It was estimated that the each policeman in Jordan was forty thousand US dollar. This is significantly higher than it would have cost to send a student for full year of advanced studies at prestigious Ivy League College. And another example of Cluster Battles’ alleged fraud : Charging $95, 000 for a helicopter pad that they were supposed to build in Mosul, they billed $157 for it. And Mike Battles himself actually absent mindedly left a piece of paper detailing how $3.74 million spent had been billed $9.8 Million.
Conclusion
In May 2003, a memo by a senior British official described the office of General Garner, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as’ an unbelievable mess’. This judgment would soon be applicable to mere than state of the bureaucracy. The chaos started because there was no real planning. The US Defense Department took Over responsibility for it from the State Department in early 2003 and ignored all the work done until then.
There were some gains. There years after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein the Dictator himself was on trial for crimes against humanity. A parliament had been elected. New Iraqi police and security forces existed. British forces were starting to leave. Both Kurds and Shi’a could believe in a future in which their rights might be acknowledged.
But there were also major setbacks and danger. Voting in the December 2005 election was divided along ethnic and religious lines, revealing the potential for a profound fracturing of the country. The risks were illustrated by insurgent attacks on Shi’a religious sites in early 2006, compared to pre-2003, there was less clean water, sewage control and energy supply. Oil output was down 30 per cent. Crime was rampant and unemployment was about 50 per cent. There was little rebuilding in destroyed urban areas, and CPA had lost $9 billion of oil revenue before it dissolve in June 2004.
The chaos was partly the result of deliberate and shrewd disruption by insurgent groups. As well as general terror to promote instability and disorder, they target water, oil and power, as well as police recruits, the occupying forces and Iraqis who worked with them, religious sites, and qualified professional such as doctor and lawyers. When they needed to hide, they imposed themselves on towns and villages and got cooperation through fear.
The insurgents included al-Qaida and associated groups as well as Ba’athists. Their shared aim was to make the occupation impossible. Longer term the Ba’thists wanted power back while al-Qaida ultimately sought a new political order in the West Asia. In the first half of 2006, insurgents were thought to number 15000-20000.
In addition, there were well organized shi’s militias such as the Badr militia linked to one of the main Shi’s political groups in the south, the Mahdi Army led by cleric Moqtaba al-Sadr, and smaller group run by Shi’a politicians including government ministers. By mid-2006 they were blamed for hundreds of killings and kidnappings each month. Sunni militias were organized in response.
Facing this, the Army routinely employed massive force, in line with its Soldier’s Credo, which is not merely to defeat buy to destroy the enemy. It works intimidatingly well in war but its less effective when the idea is to win the peace. The abuse of Iraqi Prisoners in Abu Gharib and elsewhere was on a scale that indicates it was deliberate policy, done out of perceived military necessity.
Estimates put the Cost to the US as high $3 trillion. In Iraq, the price was paid daily by ordinary people. As the insurgency and occupation continued the death toll rose, fear deepened and for most people basic conditions of life got worse. By 2006, Iraq had become a country in which to go shopping meant to risk one’s life.
After all America all do this for oil but presently Now we see what has happening. The Iraqi oil law has not yet been passed because different directions the Iraqis in one way the foreign companies in another way. Also, when it comes to open bidding the Chinese companies the Indian companies, the Brasillians- they are going to outbid Western companies any day. Why ? Because Western companies have to bear much higher overhead costs. It is therefore not surprising at all that the Chinese got the contract first. and the the dispersion of native Iraqis to other countries is known as the Iraqi Diaspora. There have been many large-scale waves of emigration from Iraq, beginning early in the regime of Saddam Hussein and continuing through to 2007. The UN High Commission for Refugees has estimated that nearly two million Iraqis have fled the country in recent years, mostly to Jordan and Syria. Although some expatriates returned to Iraq after the 2003 invasion, the flow had virtually stopped by 2006.
In addition to the 2 million Iraqis who fled to neighboring countries, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates the number of people currently displaced within the country at 1.9 million.
Roughly 40% of Iraq’s middle class is believed to have fled, the U.N. said. Most are fleeing systematic persecution and have no desire to return. Refugees are mired in poverty as they are generally barred from working in their host countries
References:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan (2008), “Gulf Military forces in an era of asymmetric Wars, Pentagon Press”
Dan Smith, (2006),”The State of West Asia”, Earthscan Pulishers
Tareq Y Ismael & Jacqueline S Ismael, “ whither Iraq ? Beyond Saddam, Sanctions and Occupation”, Third World Quarterly (2005) Vol- 26, page
Geoff Simons (2006), “Future of Iraq: US policy in Reshaping the West Asia”
Toby dodge (2005),m “Iraq’s Future The Aftermath of Regime Change”
Jacqueline Ismael, tareq Y. Ismael and Raymond William Baker, “Iraq and Human development :culture Education and The Globalization of Hope”, Volume 26, Number 2, Spring 2004
“Iraq ablaze” ,Chapter three- The America are wrong footed 1990-2005.
World Focus, “US,UN and Iraq”, Volume 25, Number 1, January 2004, page 10 to 13
http://www.heritage.org/research/middleeast/bg1594.cfm
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2003/0430iraq_baram.aspx
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040701faessay83409-p20/george-a-lopez-david-cortright/containing-iraq-sanctions-worked.html
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/Reconstruction_Planning.pdf
